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ABSTRACT: In Japanese passenger transportation, 172 private rail companies (including 14 so-called "major" 
operators) play an important role, particularly in large metropolitan areas. Although it is well known that they 
are financially independent, it is an open question how they can manage. The main issues that we address in this 
paper, therefore are two-fold: how can these private railway companies manage their business without lump-sum 
subsidies, and are there lessons which may be transferable to other contexts? In order to address these issues, we 
deal with the following points; (1) the urban structure of the Keihanshin metropolitan area which is used as a case 
study in this paper, (2) the performance of private rail companies and their diversification strategies, (3) some 
misperceptions about Japanese private rail companies, and ( 4) possible lessons which might be transferable to 
other contexts. The paper concludes that the Japanese situation is not idiosyncratic and private rail cqmpanies 
have shown the ability and potential to provide public transportation services more efficiently and effectively. 
The most important lessons from urban private rail companies in Japan is that the key point is to establish the 
principle(s) and the conditions (and/or inducements) which can assure the autonomy of the organization in the 
(reasonably) long-run. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Japanese passenger transportation, 172 private rail companies (including 14 so-called "major" 
operators) play an important role, particularly in large metropolitan areas. In principle, there are no lump-sum 
subsidies available for these private railway companies since the national government still maintains a strict policy 
of self-sufficiency for local public transportation. This appears to be an exceptional case, because in most 
industrial countries, urban public transport services fail to cover even their avoidable costs from business revenue. 
The main issues that we will address in this paper, therefore are two-fold: how can these private railway 
companies manage their business without subsidies and are there lessons which may be transferable to other 
contexts? In order to address these issues, we will deal with the following points; (1) the urban structure of the 
Keihanshin metropolitan area which will be used as a case study in this paper, (2) the performance of private rail 
companies and their diversification strategies, (3) some misperceptions about Japanese private rail companies, 
and ( 4) possible lessons which might be transferable to other contexts. 
Before discussing these issues, we will demonstrate the significance of rail transportation in Japan. 
2. IMPORTANCE OF RAIL 
Table 1 shows the transportation mode shares in the major metropolitan areas. This table shows that rail 
is still dominant among public transport modes with a share similar to that of automobile( except Nagoya) 
Table 1: Urban Transportation Weekday Mode' Shares(%) 
Year Rail Bus Auto Otherh 
KeiHanShinc 1980 19.0 4.4 19.2 57.4 
1970 19.5 6.7 15.5 58.3 
Tokyo 1988 25.0 2.8 27.5 44.7 
1978 22.8 4.0 24.2 49.0 
Nagoya 1980 9.7 3.0 39.6 47.7 
Notes: a. If the trip-maker used more than two modes for a trip, one of these modes is defined as the "main 
transportation mode" of the trip. The main mode of transportation of a trip is determined in the 
priority order of Rail, Bus, Auto (Car & Taxi), Two-wheel vehicle, and Walking. 
b. Other includes walking and two-wheel vehicle. 
c. Kei-Han-Shin stands for Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe. 
Source: Person-trip Surveys 
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From Table 2, among rail, we can observe the large contribution of the private rail category. To 
circumvent problems with the interpretation of data involving different size of areas and auto usage levels, Table 
2 also shows the passenger trips per capita. As expected given Table 1, all usage rates are considerably lower for 
Nagoya than for the other areas. We can also calculate the following private rail shares of the total public 
transportation market: Keihanshin has 41 °lo compared with 31 % and 30o/o for Tokyo and Nagoya respectively. 
We will therefore, choose the Keihanshin area as a case study site, though sometimes we will also use national 
statistics. 
Table 2: Passenger Volume (million person) 
Fiscal Year 1988 Heavy Rail Bus, Public [Pop:million J 
from 1st April 1988 Tram& Transport (Density) 
to 31st March 1989 JR Private Subway Taxi Total (person/km') 
Tokyo Trans. Area 4,783 4,657 2,628 3,118 15,187 [27.265] 
trips per capita 175 176 96 115 557 (4,255) 
Nagoya Trans. Area 226 489 330 568 1,612 [7.195] 
trips per capita 31 68 46 79 224 (1,863) 
Kei-Han-Shin T. A. 1,203 2,653 1,077 1,552 6,484 [15.378] 
trips per capita 78 173 70 101 422 (2,867) 
Note: The Transportation Area includes most administrative units (cities, towns and villages) lying within 
50km (in the case of Nagoya: 40km) of the center of the each central city. 
Source: Unyu Keizai Center, Toshi Kotsu Nenpo 1990 
Table 3: Trip Purpose and Modal Split in Keihanshin (1980:weekday) 
Purpose Rail Bus Auto 2-Wheel Walking Volume 
Work 38.5% 5.6% 28.0% 18.0% 9.8% 5.6 (mill./day) 
Business 10.8% 2.8% 47.0% 15.1% 24.0% 6.05 
School 16.9% 4.7% 1.4% 9.2% 67.8% 4.14 
Private 9.8% 4.6% 13.1% 26.5% 46.0% 9.85 
Note: 2-Wheel includes bicycle, moped, and motorcycle. 
Source: 1980 Keihanshin Person-trip Survey 
Table 3 shows the trip purpose and modal split in the Keihanshin area. For work trips rail 
transportation was the dominant mode, capturing almost 40o/o of all commuter trips. On the other hand, for 
business trips, auto was the dominant mode. 
3. URBAN SPATIAL STRUCTURE IN KEIHANSHIN 
Urban spatial structure greatly affects the transportation system and its performance and is in turn 
affected by it. Residential and workplace location might be especially important factors in understanding the 
market structure for transportation. In this section, we will describe the urban structure of Keihanshin. 
Keihanshin is the second largest metropolitan areii in Japan in terms of population and economic base. 
Though there are several definitions of the Keihanshin metropolitan area, it includes the three major cities of 
Kyoto ("KE!"), Osaka ("HAN") and Kobe ("SHIN") [Figure 1]. 
Table 4 shows population, population density and car ownership levels of the Keihanshin area. The 
"modified metropolitan area(MMA)" of each city is composed of a central city and its commuting area. This 
definition is used to identify zones which contain one or more administrative units (wards, cities, towns and/or 
villages) lying within the commuting range of the core area of the central city and thus qualifying for incorporation 
into the metropolitan ring. The criterion used is that the proportion of the work-trips generated in each zone 
commuting to the core area zone must be greater than five per cent based on the 1980 Person Trip Survey. Given 
the fact that there is some difference of the definition of each "core area" zone, we should be careful in interpreting 
data from this table. 
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Figure 1. Rail Routes of Keihanshin Transportation Area (Harch 1990) 
(Source: Unyu Keizai Center, Toshi Kotsu Kenpo 199~ 
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Table 4: Population and Car Ownership in Each Urban Unit (1988) 
Kyoto Osaka Kobe Trans. Total 
Core City MMA Core City MMA Core City MMA Area MMA' 
Area(km') 29 611 2,001 14 213 3,809 37 546 1,353 5,364 6,916 
Pop. (*103) 315 1,475 2,753 103 2,645 12,071 243 1,448 2,786 15,378 16,538 
Densityc 110 24 14 71 124 32 63 27 21 29 24 
Car (*10') 126 310 612 92b 1,023 2,325 106 255 541 N.A. 3,273 
Per House .473 .577 .666 .66Qb .423 .557 .391 .482 . 564 N.A. .578 
Notes: a. excludes double counts, b. Osaka CBD, c. (person/hectare) 
Sources: National Census, 1980 Keihanshin Person-trip Survey, and Toyo-keizai, Toyokeizai Data Bank 1990. 
From the table we can see that the Osaka metropolitan area is much larger than the Kyoto and Kobe 
areas, which have similar populations. If we consider the different size of each core area zone which is the 
"attraction zone" of metropolitan area, we could say that Osaka is dominant in the Keihanshin area. In fact, when 
we define the metropolitan area of Kobe using the Central Business District (CBD: 24km2) which have roughly 
same size of the core of Kyoto as the attraction zone, the population decreases to three quarters. The table also 
shows that the Transportation area is a fairly good proxy for the Keihanshin metropolitan area. 
Table 5: Trend of Night-time Population and Day Time Population (thousands) 
Place ( Area:km2) 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Osaka CBD (24) 353 312 250 207 206 212: Nighttime 
871 988 1,013 1,075 1,060 1,147: Daytime 
OsakaCity (212) 3,012 3,156 2,980 2,779 2,648 2,636: Nighttime 
3,495 3,862 3,854 3,774 3,651 3,714: Daytime 
NA 2,290 NA 2,323 2,267 2,332: 
Employment 
3 CBDs Tota1(68) 990 911 769 661 613 603: Nighttime 
Osaka+ Kobe+ Kyoto 1,703 1,830 1,794 1,856 1,813 1,889: Daytime 
Cities Total = A 5,410 5,738 5,688 5,601 5,488 5,526: Nighttime 
(A/B) 54.7% 49.3% 43.1% 38.9% 36.8% 35.9% 
5,927 6,511 6,682 6,757 6,676 6,797: Daytime 
K-H-S. TA=B 9,892 11,642 13,211 14,415 14,928 15,377: Nighttime 
B I National Pop. 10.5% 11.3% 12.6% 12.9% 12.8% 12.7% 
Source: National Census 
Table 5 shows the trend of nighttime populatio.n and daytime population of the Keihanshin area. 
Nighttime population is the population by usual place of residence, while daytime population is the population 
by place of work or schooling, and is one index of urban activity. As an analytical unit of this table, we introduce 
the CBD of each central city whichcover similar areas. 
From this table, characteristic points are summarized as follows: (1) Although Keihanshin is still growing, 
since 1975 the population growth rate is fairly small and similar to the National rate. (2) The nighttime population 
of CBDs is decreasing and the ratio of central cities population to the Keihanshin transportation area also shows 
a continuous decrease, though it seems that the rate of decrease slowed in 1980s. (3) In the Osaka CBD, even 
though the nighttime population has decreased, the daytime population shows slow growth. ( 4) The daytime 
population and the employment of Osaka city shows a mixed pattern. (5) The difference between the daytime 
population and the nighttime population shows continuous growth. 
From these findings, it is clear that there is suburbanization of residences in the Keihanshin area, and 
though we do not have any explicit evidence about suburbanization of workplaces, it is probably true that the 
importance of the CBDs as a workplace is still high and commuting flows to central areas are still growing. The 
possible interpretation of the somewhat inconsistent facts between the trend in CBD and in central cities is that 
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the changes in industry have different effects according to the area. The decline in traditional industries 
(especially basic industries such as steel and chemicals) has hit the old cities. On the other hand, the CBD features 
growth industries such as the service, information and communication industries for which the CBD might have 
a competitive edge. 
There are eighteen rail routes which serve the huge traffic flow into and out of Osaka City. In a peak hour, 
they carried about 680,000 people into the city and for the full day 2.3 million (in 1985). 
4. PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE RAIL COMPANIES 
4.1. Rail Division 
Among all transportation modes in the Keihanshin area, we could say that rail is the most convenient and 
widely used. It is also clear that rail is particularly important for journeys to and from the central areas such as 
CBD and for the commuter market. In fact, when we look at the rail share of the commuting market to each 
central city; Osaka has 82.2% , Kobe 74.9% and Kyoto 70% based on the 1980 Keihanshin person trip survey. 
These numbers are understandable given the fact that rail has a built-in competitive advantage in the urban 
market, because severe traffic congestion and parking difficulty help sustain patronage, at least for the present 
and in the foreseeable future. 
Although there are a little less than twenty private rail companies serving the Keihanshin area, the five 
private rail companies which are categorized as major rail companies, are dominant, carrying 2,444 million 
passengers in FY1988. The remaining twelve private rail companies carried only 439 million passengers in the 
same fiscal year. As you can see in Figure 1, the main function of private rail companies is regional service. All 
have their terminals located at or very close to the center of Osaka and the other ceptral cities. 
In FY1960, the five private rail companies carried 1,282 million passengers, of which roughly two thirds 
were season pass holders. By FY1975 the number traveling had increased by 1,000 million passengers, but the 
following ten years saw much more modest increases in passengers: 2,378 million people traveled in FY1985 and 
1,498 million were season pass holders. 
So, the passenger volumes of private rail companies have shown continuous growth, though the rate of 
growth has flagged since the mid 1970s. This result might be explained in part by fairly small growth rate in total 
population, but the main causes are likely to be changes in urban structure and major competition from private 
cars. 
Table 6 shows some key financial performance indices for the rail divisions of the five major private rail 
companies in the Keihanshin area from FY1984 to FY1989. Revenue from operations consists of fare revenues 
and miscellaneous revenues such as rents receivable and commercial advertisements. The total revenue is the 
sum of the revenue from operation and the other income such as allocated financial returns (interest and dividend 
income, and foreign currency exchange gain) and gain on sales of rail related property and equipment, etc. Net 
revenue before the corporate income tax is equal to total revenue minus total cost which is the sum of the cost 
of operations and other expenses. More than ninety per cent of these other expenses is interest expense. 
Although private rail companies are privately owned and operated, they are not allowed to change fares 
freely. By law, private rail fares are subject to the approval of the central government, namely the Ministry of 
Transportation (MoT). Even in the case of fare diversification such as discount tickets, private rail companies 
must submit changes to MoT and these must be approved before implementation. Because fares are set so as to 
allow rail companies to cover expected total costs for rail operation and yield a reasonable profit from providing 
rail services, we may say that the total revenue is strongly controlled by MoT. To date MoT has given permission 
to raise fares every three years, so the profitability of the rail business shows a periodic pattern with three year 
cycle. 
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Table 6: Profitability of Five Major Private Rail: Rail Division 
Fare Net Net Rev Allocated Revenue Revenue 
Fiscal Revenue Revenue before Income Tax from Ope. from Ope. Total 
Year Total from Corporate +Dividend I Cost of I Cost of Revenue 
(billion Operation Income Tax Required 0 without O.include I Total 
Yen) (bil. Yen) (bil. Yen) (bil. Yen) Depreciat. Depreciat Cost 
FY1984: 295.0 57.6 21.5 15.2 1.40 1.21 1.07 
FY1985: 297.1 49.5 14.4 15.1 1.36 1.17 1.04 
FY1986: 301.8 43.0 6.1 16.4 1.34 1.14 1.02 
FY1987: 324.6 58.4 21.8 18.1 1.41 1.19 1.06 
FY1988: 339.2 60.5 24.8 18.5 1.41 1.19 1.07 
FY1989: 340.6 50.9 18.8 21.4 1.38 1.15 1.05 
Note: Numbers in Italics show the year which had (or had effected) the fare hike. During the period, we had 
three fare hikes: 17 Jan 1984, 16May1987 and !st April 1989. However, because the last hike was the 
result of introducing the general consumption tax (3°/o) by the government, we did not show it in Italics. 
Source: Federation of Private Rail Companies, Mintetsu News, No.64 (1985), 69 (1986), 72 (1987), 85 (1988), 96 
(1989) and 107 (1990). 
To circumvent problems with interpretation of data involving this periodic pattern, we should look at sets 
of comparable years, such as FY1985 and FY1988, and FY!986 and FY!989. In both cases, net revenue before 
corporate income tax increased by about twelve billion yen and total cost recovery ratio (total revenue divided 
by total cost) also increased. From these findings, we can say that their business and profitability generally show 
steady growth. 
When we look at the growth rates of revenue from operation and some cost items between FY 1984 and 
FYl 989, revenue increased by 17°/o, labor cost 15o/o, and interest-5°/o. So it is clear that the improvement in labor 
efficiency and the reduction of interest charges contribute to the recent growth of the profitability. Moreover, 
it is remarkable that interest charges have been decreasing, in spite of the rapid growth of depreciation ( 49°/o in 
the same period) which is the result of high levels of investments. 
Table 7 shows the situation of each rail company in the Keihanshin area. We can see that all companies 
are profitable, even though there are fairly sizable differences among companies in terms of both size and market. 
We can also observe, however, that the ratios of labor cost and capital cost to the total cost are rather high. Because 
these costs are "fixed" in the "short- run", this means that the companies must deal with a lack of flexibility in its 
cost structure. 
Table 7: The Individual Performance of Rail Companies (FY88): Rail Division 
Passenger NetR Revenue Cost Labor Capital Traffic Vehicle 
Route Traffic before per per Cost Cos th Density -kms 
-km (million Tax Veh-km Veh-km /Fare /Fare (/day)' /Staff" 
(km) person) (*JO') (Yen) (Yen) Rev. Rev. (*10') (*JO') 
Kintetsu a 592 765.7 25,583 577 ,. 487 .39 .25 67 26.6 
Hankyu 147 799.0 12,536 585 504 .40 .27 208 32.9 
Nankai 166 302.2 11,654 697 544 .40 .30 80 24.4 
Keihan 89 394.5 7,218 584 498 .43 .20 157 28.1 
Hanshin 45 247.l 2,595 725 652 .38 .18 141 24.2 
Osaka City 106 967.7 20,441 1395 1173 .47 NA 144 11.7 
JR-West" 5207 1566.3 78,605 740 667 NA NA 25 22.3 
Notes: a. Their service area exceeds the Keihanshin area. 
b. Capital cost is the sum of depreciation and interest. 
c. Traffic density calculated by the following formula; Traffic density= (Annual Passenger kilometer) 
/(Route kilometer) I 365 
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d. The number of staff includes the number of allocated employees to the rail division who belong to 
the central administrative department of the company. 
Source: Institute of Urban Transport Studies(l 989), Osaka Toshi Kotsu Y oran 1989. 
4.2. Diversification Strategy 
Probably the most significant finding to come from any study of the private rail companies in Japan is their 
diversification strategy, though, as private entities, it is clearly rational and understandable "corporate" behavior, 
given the somewhat steady but fairly low profitability of the rail business and its "vulnerability" to political 
intervention. Moreover, they might have additional incentives to diversify, because their dominant business is 
regulated in many respects and the rail lines produce "externalities" along the lines. In fact, the diversified 
businesses such as a real estate, retailing at the terminal, and recreation and attractions have a possibi1ity that these 
businesses could contribute to an increase in rail ridership indirectly and to reducing the difference in demand 
for rail between peak and off-peak periods. Similar to other industries, there are three motivations of 
diversification strategy for private rail companies: (1) economies of growth, (2) economies of scope, and (3) risk 
dispersion. 
The following list presents the kinds of business activities which private rail companies are also involved 
in; (1) transportation (bus, taxi, boat, car rentals, trucking, and forwarders), (2) real estate (estate agency, land 
development, space leasing, and maintenance), (3) retailing (department stores, supermarkets, and boutiques}, 
(4) recreation business (travel agencies, hotels, amusement parks, entertainments, sports clubs and stadiums, 
food service, and cultural activities), (5) manufacturing and construction (rolling stock, engineering, and 
construction), (6) information and communication, and other services (cable television, computer services, 
advertisements, and insurance agency). Figure 2 gives a chronological overview of diversification of five rail 
companies. 
Table 8 shows the extent of in-house diversification Abusinesses within the rail company. Because the 
private rail companies will prefer to show stable profitability growth for the whole company, we cannot deny the 
possibility that they might control the scale of diversified business according to the profitability of rail division. 
So, if we see the data from the year just before the fare hike, the share of the diversified business could be high. 
To circumvent this problem we showed the average of FY1984, FY1985 and FY1986, which represent one 
complete fare cycle. 
Table 8: The Share of Operating Revenue and Net Operating Revenue of 
Each Business to Company Total Revenue (FY84-86 average:%) 
Share of Operating Revenue Share of Net Operating Revenue 
Company Rail Bus Subtotal Other Rail & Bus Other 
Kintetsu 79 6 85 15 59 41 
Hankyu• 66 66 34 54 46 
Nankai 61 14 75 25 64 36 
Keihana 54 54 46 58 42 
Hanshin 52 9 61 39 42 58 
14 majors 
Average 53 15b 68 32 55 45 
Notes a: The bus business is provided by their subsidiaries 
b: This number is the average of 11 companies. 
Source: Kanaya(1987b), pp.45-46. 
The share of operating revenue from other business shows the scale of in-house diversification. From the 
table the scale of other business is roughly one third, though there is considerable variation among companies. 
The table also shows the share of the net operating revenue which represents the "quality" of diversified business. 
Because we are more interested in diversification to non-transportation areas, we categorized areas as by 
transportation (rail and bus) and other. About 45o/o of the net operating revenue is earned by non-transportation 
business. 
In comparison. in FY1960, the share of the operating revenue of other business in fourteen major private 
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rail companies was just 12o/o compared with a rail share of 67% and bus share of21 % . The share of other business 
grew to 22% in FY 1965 and to 41 % in FY1970. Because the main business included in the "other" category is 
real estate, this growth might reflect the urbanization in the metropolitan areas. Moreover we can say that thereal 
estate business (especially residential developments) has been a driving force for the private rail companies, 
particularly in times of outstanding economic growth and rapid urbanization. 
However this aspect of diversification shows only a part of the full range of their diversified businesses. 
Private rail companies also diversify outside the company, and, as a whole, they form a multi-product association 
called "group." In fact, the private rail companies always point out enthusiastically how they should be viewed 
and analyzed as just one of these associated companies. For example, the Corporate Brochure 1989 of Hankyu 
on the cover starts following sentences: 
HANKYU - the name that symbolizes 82 years of services as one of Japan's leading railway 
companies. Hankyu is also the name that represents a conglomerate of 305 companies and bodies. 
Moreover, the Brochure ends with following sentences; 
The Group provides a comprehensive lineup of services tailored to the needs of everyday life, ranging 
from transportation, urban development and resort development to distribution, leisure, culture and 
communications. As the leader of the Group, the 
Hankyu is contributing steadily to requirements of the 21st century. 
Table 9 shows a summary of Kintetsu group. Similar lists could be presented for other private rail 
companies. 
Except for one case, the flagship company of all major-rail groups is still the private rail company. The 
members of the each group are bound together by cross-ownership and other financial ties, interlocking 
directorates, long-term business relationships, and social and historical links, though many companies are fairly 
independent entities. They form an organizational network albeit with somewhat "weak" ties between firms, and 
companies together straddle the entire "food chain" Ato the full range of lifestyle service needs. 
Table 9: Profde of Kintetsu Group (March 1989) 
Type of Number of 
Business Companies Gross Sales 
Rail 1 225.1 ( 9%) 
Trucking & Air Cargo forwarders 4 246.7 (10%) 
Other Transport:Bus, Taxi, Boat, etc. 47 133.0 ( 5%) 
Real Estate 12 132.9 ( 5%) 
Retailing (Department Stores, Car sales etc.) 20 520.7 (21%) 
Travel Agencies 5 570.1 (23%) 
Hotels & Inns 26 84.1( 3%) 
Food Services 9 54.9 ( 2%) 
Recreation and Entertainment 13 22.9 ( 1%) 
Manufacturing (Rolling stocks), Engineering, 18 473.0 (19%) 
Construction, and other Businesses 
Total 155 2463.4 (100%) 
billion Yen 
Source: Corporate Brochure of Kintetsu 
5. SOME POSSIBLE MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT JAPANESE PRIVATE 
RAIL COMPANIES 
Number of 
Employees 
11,710 (15%) 
18,640 (23%) 
14,630 (18%) 
1,600 ( 2%) 
10,140 (13%) 
5,570 ( 7%) 
5,300 ( 7%) 
2,810 ( 4%) 
1,580 ( 2%) 
8,110 (10%) 
80,090 (100%) 
Person 
So far, we have seen the present conditions of urban structure and private rail companies in the 
Keihanshin area. This section compares some perceptions against reality, focussing on the profitability of the 
private rail companies, their management skills, and the government policy towards private rail companies. 
Perception: There are subsidies for urban private rail companies. 
Reality: Although governments provide some subsidies for the construction of new lines in urban areas, 
private rail companies are not eligible for subsidies except for nominal and indirect subsidy such as receiving 
money for interest repayment over a certain (5o/o) interest rate. 
To receive this interest repayment support, a private rail company has to contract out its construction to 
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the Agency of Railway Construction which is a public corporation founded by the central government and is the 
sole organization eligible to receive subsidy for partial interest repayment. The agency funds the construction and 
after construction sells the new rail line to rail companies over a long time period. Private rail companies pay back 
its total cost to the Agency in 15 or 25 years using a straight-line method. We should stress that this subsidy is rather 
nominal, given the huge cost of construction. Moreover, in a recent twelve year period (from FY1977 to FY1988), 
only 8% of the total private rail investments used this method which started in FY 1972. 
Moreover there is no subsidy system for urban private rails' operating expenses, though private rail 
companies do get somewhat favored treatment for real estate and utility consumption tax, and depreciation. They 
can also borrow the money for certain types of investment from the Japan Development Bank (public 
corporation) at somewhat below market rates (5.1 % or 6% in September 1989). However, the impact of these 
treatments is again rather small, and the ratio of the funds borrowed from the Japan Development Bank to the 
total investments by the private rail companies has been decreasing (in FY1988 the ratio was 24o/o compared with 
40% in FYI 983). 
Perception: Although the private rail companies make profit, the rail division of each companies lose 
money. 
Perception: They disguise the true accounting numbers by arbitrary cost- and revenue-allocation 
processes. 
Reality: There is an explicit rule to prevent cross-subsidy between rail and other business. According 
to the Rail Business Act (Sec. 20), all rail operators have to adopt the accounting rules which are established and 
published by the Ministry of Transportation. The rail business accounting ordinance includes provisions which 
prescribe the principle for the allocation of revenues, common fixed assets, and common costs such as 
administration costs. Tables also explicitly prescribe the allocation method for common costs and revenues. In 
fact, all numbers shown in this paper, unless otherwise noted, come from published sources and include only the 
results of "rail division." 
Private rail companies cannot, therefore, change their allocation methods arbitrarily. We do not deny 
the possibility that the company's other division act asa "shock absorber" in times of low( or even un-) profitability 
in a rail division. Particularly, a private rail company's real estate division can sen more land ifthe need arises. 
It seems, however, that this strategy is not unreasonable and is a rational way of risk dispersion. Moreover, we 
should stress that the revenue from those businesses does not make any direct contribution to the profitability 
of the rail division and the probability which the company would be able to sell the land is not assured. 
Perception: The fares of private rail companies are rather high. 
Perception: Because the fares are regulated using the full-cost based formula, the profitability of rail 
businesses is guaranteed by the government. 
Reality: As we already noted, the fare levels are set by the government using the fair rate of return 
plus full-cost formula, so private rail companies can not set their fares freely. In this context, the fare level should 
be fair, because it is regulated. In fact, the Real fares level which is deflated by the consumer price indexes have 
been fairly stable. If we take the FY1934 as the base year (=100), in FY1966 the number was 41, in FY1976=40, 
in FY1986 =42, and in FY1988=44. 
Moreover. when comparing their fare levels to the municipal railways and JR, we see fairly low fare levels 
for the private rail companies. This is supported by table 10 which shows the average fares per passenger 
kilometer for each company. Because each organization has its own fare structure, we adopt the average fare as 
the measure of interest. 
Table 10: Average Fare Revenue per Passenger KilometerJFY88, Unit: Yen) 
Private Rails Municipal Rails West 
Kintetsu Hankyu Nankai Keihan Hanshin Osaka 
Season Pass Holders 5.99 
Other Passengers 18.85 
5.00 
12.86 
7.21 6.11 
17.69 15.24 
7.12 
14.68 
15.55 
33.74 
Kobe 
12.86 
26.75 
Kyoto JR 
23.52 
45.38 
6.46 
19.96 
Note: These numbers are calculated by total fares revenue divided by the total passenger kilometers carried 
by the company. 
Source: Institute of Urban Transport Studies(l 989), Osaka Toshi Kotsu Y oran 1989. 
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Although fare levels are set by the government, it does not mean that the profitability of rail businesses 
is guaranteed. At any time there is a lag between the companies' official fare hike application to the MoT and 
its implementation (on an average of just over 4 months for four recent fare hikes), and the increases sought have 
been curtailed (from one-seventh to one-fifth for the same hikes). During the early 70s when the government 
wanted to control hyper- inflation and poStponed increases in price over which it had control, the rail divisions 
produced deficits. It is hard to raise fares faster than the inflation rate. It might be better to understand that the 
fare regulation is in practice a "price-cap" regulation using the consumer price index. 
Perception: Private rail companies have not made sizable investments and use facilities which are fully 
depreciated. 
Perception: The service level of private rail companies is relative low. 
Reality: As we noted in earlier, they have made substantial investments which have created some 
problems with their cost structure. It might be true that their attitude to new rail line investments has been rather 
conservative than subways (municipal railways and Eidan Acorporation) and most of their investments are 
focussed on increasing the capacity of the existed lines. In fact, the total route kilometers of subways increased 
from ll 7km in 1965 to 512km in 1989, compared with only a slight increase in total route kilometers of private 
rail companies in the major urban areas - from 3031km to 3049km. However, as a private company, this is 
understandable and probably rational behavior, given the huge investments required for new lines and the 
uncertainty of their expected profitability. 
It is rather difficult to judge whether the service level of a company is high or low, since there are many 
exogenous variables and perceptional factors which have relation to the service level. But there are some pieces 
of evidence suggested that the perception is not true. 
The most convincing is their efforts to increase the capacity and to decrease the peak load rate. In fact, 
if we take the peak capacity (in term of vehicle-kilometers) of private rails in the FY1966as the base year (=100), 
in FY 1976 the index grew to 138, and in FY1988=176. The average peak load ratio of major private rails is 
decreased by 28% in the same period, namely 231 (in FYl 966) to 180 (in FY! 988). On the contrary, the average 
peak load ratio of JR's equivalent lines is decreased only by 18% (from 253 to 215) in the same period. 
Perception: Because of the diversified businesses such as a real estate, retailing at the terminal and 
attractions, the peak ratio of private rail companies is low. 
Reality: There were no substantial differences in the peak ratio between JNR and private rail 
companies. In 1985, the weighted average of the peak ratio (the ratio of the passenger carried in a super-peak 
hour in one direction to the total passenger of the whole day in same direction) of thirteen private rail lines which 
serve Osaka city is .30, ranging from .22 to .39. compared with the JNR lines average ratio of average .30, ranging 
from .26 to .37. From this fact, we can not say that private rail companies have succeeded in decreasing the daily 
temporal variation. 
Moreover, in 1975, the average peak ratio of the private rail companies lines was .29, while that of the JNR 
lines was .27. So the private rail companies' ratio had been slightly lower than JNR. A possible reason for this 
is that the residential development along the private rail lines was somewhat faster than along the JNR line areas, 
and this might be affected in part by the private rail company's diversified businesses. 
When looking at the ratio of weekend traffic to weekday traffic, we can present a slightly different story. 
Although three major private rail companies have a rather similar ratio to the JRs, the other two companies show 
a fairly small drop in weekend. In the case of the former group, the Saturday traffic decreases by about 15% from 
the weekday traffic and the Sunday traffic decreased by about 30%. In the case of two companies, however, the 
weekend (either Saturday or Sunday) traffic decreases by only 10%. 
Perception: Strong support by the government contributes to the results of the private rail companies. 
Reality: From the previous discussion on the subsidy system for private rail companies in Japan, it 
is hard to believe that there is strong support by governments for rail. Whereas some people argue that there are 
strong government policies to restrict car ownership and use, and to induce high density urban development, we 
can not find any strong supporting evidence. In contrast, there are some cases which might show the failure of 
"de-hyperurbanization" policies. 
It is true that many companies provide commuting expenses and these are generally used for public 
transport. We should stress, however, that there is no direction by the government and that in most cases car is 
more expensive for both the society and the employer (so, probably also the employee) than public transport, 
given the scarcity of land and congested roads in urban areas. 
Perception: Private rail companies have too much market power in the "railway commuter towns." 
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Reality: If the people feel that they are captive and that the private rail company or the group has 
too much market power in the area, it is a failure of the company's business strategy. As private companies, any 
negative reputation for the brand or the company name will be very damaging. This negative reputation may 
trigger changes from rail-oriented to car-oriented in land-use pattern and life-styles. 
On the contrary, private rail companies and their groups ought to design their whole corporate strategy 
to contribute to good, close relations with the local communities, since as the going concern entities, private rails 
should pay attention to the profitability and the growth in the long run. 
6. POSSIBLE LESSONS 
So far we have addressed the first issue of how private railway companies can manage without 
subsidies. In this last section we will ask whether there are lessons which may be transferable to other 
contexts? From our earlier discussion, it seems that the answer to this question would be yes. We will 
present, therefore, the possible lessons which might be transferable. Probably, the determinants of whether 
private rail companies can be financially independent fall into two categories; (1) environments- market 
conditions and the legislation governing the private rail companies, (2) management skills. 
The market conditions for Japanese private rail companies in the metropolitan areas might be 
somewhat idiosyncratic in terms of traffic volume, though private rail companies have taken some initiatives 
in prompting systematic regional development in the areas which their networks have served ever since their 
establishment. 
Most private rail lines dose not face direct competitions from other rail company's line extend over 
whole sections. Viewed in this context, we might be able to claim that rail transit is the "natural monopolies." 
Because all major private rail companies have their lines in the densely populated areas, they might have a 
buit-in competitive advantage. However, we should remember that there are profound competitions from 
other modes especially private cars and there are pressures from risk of changing land-use pattern and life-
styles -from rail-oriented to car-oriented-in the long run, though the market is not considered to be 
inherently highly contestable. 
It is also true that Japanese private rail companies have closed unremunerative lines (in most case, 
replacing them with their own bus services) and reduced freight sections in response to competition from 
automobiles (in fact, total route kilometers of "minor" private rail companies decreased from 2657km in 1965 to 
1936km in 1985). But there are still many companies which provide rail services outside the urban areas. 
Table 11 shows the number of "minor" private rail companies classified by their passenger volume and 
profitability. As an index of profitability, we adopt the ratio of the cost of operation (including depreciation) 
to the revenue from operation. From the table, we can observe that many companies which do not have 
high demand are also profitable. We should 
not, therefore, underestimate the performance of private rail companies. 
Table 11: Profitability of "Minora" Private Rail Companies (FY1983) 
Cost I 103 Passenger km per route-km per day (Traffic density) 
Revenue >10.0 6.0-10.0 4.0-6.0 2.0-4.0 1.0-2.0 <1.0 
less than 1.00 5 [5J 7 [5J 2 [1 J 1 b [1 J 1' [OJ - [-J 
1.00-1.10 [-J 2' [lJ 4 [1 J 4 [4J 4 [lJ - [-J 
more than 1.10 
- [-J - [-J 1 [OJ 5 [2J 6 [3J 11 [4J 
Note: The numbers in the []show the number of the comp .. 3nies with positive company net revenue. Company 
net revenue was equal to the sum of net revenue from rail operation and net revenue from other in-house 
diversified business operation. 
a. "Minor" companies are the private rail companies which do not have rail lines in the major urban 
areas. 
b. These three companies also carried more than 500 ton of goods per day. 
Source: Saito (1985), p.182. 
It might be "conventional wisdom" that it is impossible to introduce Japanese style private rail concepts 
in other countries. Before the deregulation of the stage bus service in U.K., however, many people 'believed' that 
it was inevitable to follow strict entry regulation in stage bus industry. Although there have been some problems 
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with this deregulation, it is widely credited with many positive impacts on public transportation, and our 
traditional "conventional wisdom" could be wrong in some sense. Therefore, we should not cease the discussion 
with the rather easy conclusion that the Japanese case is just idiosyncratic. 
From our findings, it seems that private rail companies have shown the ability and potential to provide 
public transportation services more efficiently and effectively. We should respect thier management skills in both 
rail and diversified businesses. 
Private rail companies have the reputation that they have made vigorous efforts to increase passengers, 
expand automation in the rail business, and introduce other efficiency measures. For example, the average annual 
vehicle kilometers per staff member for fourteen major private rail companies have shown continuous growth 
over a recent twenty years period. If we take the FY1960 as the base year (=100), in FY1989 the number grew 
to 335 ( 40,293 vehicle-kilometer per staff). As we saw in table 7, their productivity performance is well above that 
of both the municipal railway and JR. 
In fact, the prolonged steady financial decline of the Japan National Railways ("public corporation") 
eventually led government officials and politicians to point out to JNR the success of their major private rivals, 
and to encourage the former to try to learn from the latter (roughly speaking since the end of 1970s). In 1978 the 
diversification restriction for JNR was relaxed, the green paper which suggested the "corporatization" and 
privatization of JNR was published in 1982, and on 1st April, 1987, the rail activities of JNR were re-organized 
with a view to their privatization. 
When discussing how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public transportation service 
provision, some people argue that the point is competition from other companies which provide or may provide 
same services and the other issues such as the form of ownership (public vs private) are only secondary. We cannot 
completely agree with this assertion. 
First, as we already noted, although we agree the importance of competition, we claim that we should 
put a broad definition on competitor. 
Private rail companies are restricted in many respects by the central government (MoT) with the 
restrictions including; fares, expanding or abolishing lines or services, basic specifications of the service, financing, 
accounting methods, industrial relations and maintenance policy. However, private rail companies are financially 
independent, though they are regulated organizations. We must keep in mind even they are regulated in many 
respects, they still have full responsibility for their decisions. In short, they are autonomous commercial entities. 
For example, as we described earlier, they have last to say that new rail line investment. Moreover, they have to 
be sensitive to the "market," because their services should be provided on normal commercial criteria. 
Although we do not say that the commercial principle is the unique answer for effective public 
transportation, we find that it has good attributes and shows strong performance. The following check list gives 
some idea of the reason; (1) the rule(s) and objective(s) are of an unambiguous, non-conflicting, quantifiable, 
objectively measurable and "open-ended" form, (2) should be relevant, understandable and acceptable by 
managers, employee, politicians and interest groups, and (3) applicable (or common) to the other business 
domains. 
The legislation for the private rail companies has been well organized to deal with diversification. It gives 
a clear distinction between rail and other diversified businesses which prevents "cross-subsidy.'' 
It is true that there are certain kinds of goods or services which can be produced at no, or only nominal, 
incremental costs with rail operation. The legislation distinguished many of these businesses as the "FUT AI 
JIG YOU (inJapanese)-auxiliary business" from other diversified business such as real estate and bus. It, then, 
includes the income from "joint production" type businesses to the rail division, as miscellaneous revenue of rail 
operation or other income in the rail division. It contributes to stabilized fares (in FY1988, the weighted average 
ratios of miscellaneous revenue and other income to total fare revenue of five private rail companies were 1:8 and 
1:99 respectively). 
The white paper for the 1929 Local Rail Act asserted that the most suitable decision maker on the 
question of whether the diversified business are developed in-house or outside was the company itself. The law 
assured autonomy for the company's diversification strategy. 
By the systematic diversification strategy, the private rail company (and the group) could achieve more 
efficient and effective use of the corporate resources, such as (1) human resources, (2) physical assets (facilities, 
spaces, and distributional and procuremental channels), (3) capital, ( 4) information (know-how, technologies and 
skills), (5) good will (brand name, corporate image and consumer trust), and (6) patronage. The company could 
also improve its cost structure and enhance employee morale. Through these efforts, private rail companies 
would get a good reputation based on strong performance. 
Because, in principle, so far the central government has consistently followed a strict policy of self-
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sufficiency for local public transportation, there have been few changes in the rules of the games. Therefore, 
private rail companies can pursue their long-range strategy with broad aims. We might conclude that establishment 
of the autonomy and the commercial principle are also the key points in the success of private rail companies in 
Japan. 
We should not think of "privatization" as a panacea. There is no necessary presumption for the 
superiority of the private sector over the public sector. It might not be difficult to find a good case for saying that 
in many contexts public management would do a better job than private management. Indeed, there are public 
sector activities for which most people respect their efficiency, for example the City of Kobe. 
However, it is true that private rail companies have shown the high performance. Therefore, one of the 
important lessons which might transferable in other context is necessity and importance to produce autonomous 
organizations which will have full responsibility to provide public transportation service to the public. In other 
words, the point is to establish the principle and the conditions (or inducements) which can assure the reasonable 
autonomy of the organization in the reasonably long-run, because it will establish managerial accountability. 
Private rails might have incentives (other than reputation and patriotism) to act in the public interest. 
A final point which we should make is that while there is a clear potential for the autonomous entity, a 
well designed and carefully implemented institutional framework is necessary to achieve this potential. 
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Note: 
1. If a route runs through the city, it counts twice. We excludes the subway (Osaka municipal rail) from this 
count. It has two routes (three lines) which extend beyond the city jurisdiction and provides similar services. 
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